Maximilien Robespierre, an influential and instrumental figure in the period of the French Revolution generally branded as the Reign of Terror, formerly affirmed that, “subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic. The government of the revolution is liberty’s repression against tyranny.” In the present day, contemporary terrorists impute Robespierre’s perception that aggression is mandatory to protect and emancipate a population. Given that the number of global inhabitants is projected to multiply to 8 billion by 2025, state and international conflicts will propagate as a root of concern for the human race. The perpetual discussion for an explicit definition of what constitutes terrorism by the United Nations appears to be infinite since member countries are ineffectual to form a bilaterally accepted definition. Although the general public condemns terrorism, there remains a double standard of “us versus them” involved in such beliefs. Terrorism can be justified on one hand as there is an element of actuality to the remark “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”. On the other hand, terrorism is intrinsically corrupt therefore the rationale is to oppose terrorism in the name of ethics.
Terrorism can be accounted for as a reaction of the perpetrator due to subjugation and individuals’ political principles. Those labelled “terrorists” seldom identify themselves per se, and conventionally resort to euphemistic terms or titles specific to their condition such as separatist, freedom fighter, liberator, revolutionary, militant, guerrilla, and rebel. It can hence be construed that the perpetrators consider their actions to be righteous, perhaps even obligatory. Terrorists launch wars, claiming for just causes such as self-defence as well as aegis of innocents from threats from despotic governments, civil disorder, and external assaults. Due to a disintegration of law and stability, terrorists bear arms in retaliation to suppression of fundamental constitutional rights. By and large, the sense of duty to defend a society is vested in sovereignty clout but the administration may fail. Under these circumstances, a climate of alarm emerges thus the genesis of guerrillas. The case in point, insurgents validate Islamic terrorism as resistance to American policies in the Middle East or Israeli occupation of Palestine. Terror campaigns are also implemented in an attempt to advocate the customary system. Take for instance, Protestant extremist communities in Northern Ireland have exerted terrorism against those supporting a cohesive Ireland. Therefore, terrorism can be substantiated from the rebel’s stance, in response to contravention of one’s societal, parliamentary, spiritual and ethical dogmas.
However, religion is an inexcusable pretext for acts of terror. The Islamic faith does not condone terrorism. Suicide bombers’ actions mainly stem from political conflict, not religion. Terrorist organizations have illustrated their grounds in spiritual and cultural expressions. Nonetheless, this is frequently a blatant strategy premeditated to conceal political goals, spawn widespread fear and silence disagreement. It is fallacious to presuppose religion would typically result in carnage although religion is not totally above suspicion either.
In reality, ostensible religious terrorism transpires only under the coalescence of idiosyncratic political, social and ideological conditions. Religion becomes fused with vehement expressions of communal objectives, personal egotism, and movements for governmental reform. Thus, such heinous acts cannot be justified on tenets of religious beliefs.
Explanations for terrorism are further complicated by the ethical ambiguity that encircles terrorism. Pragmatic theorists and non-utilitarian philosophers hold contradictory opinions on whether particular acts of terrorism can be vindicated as the lesser evil in a specific circumstance. Utilitarian logicians can hypothetically formulate instances in which sin of terrorism is outweighed by significant commodities that cannot be secured with less moral loss. In practice, pragmatists repeatedly rebuff terrorism since it is extremely questionable that acts of terrorism achieve imperative goods in an efficient conduct or that the detrimental outcomes of undermining the pact of non-combatant immunity is considered to prevail over the success of terrorism. On the contrary, Don Quixotes stress that terrorism is constantly amoral unless the society faces the acute peril of absolute annihilation and the sole means of self-preservation is through deliberately targeting non-combatants. Due to ethical inconclusiveness, it is challenging to realize an accord on the settings in which terrorism can be justified.
Terrorism can be justified through the communal, constitutional, religious and moral creeds of the insurgents because in the modern world, there is no absolute right or wrong concept and there is no standard of doctrines. Moreover, terrorism is a pejorative term with intrinsically negative insinuations which are broadly relevant to one’s dissidents. To a large extent, the application of the term is exceedingly prejudiced such that its use implies a moral assessment. If a person empathizes with the victim of antagonism on one hand, then the act is considered terrorism. On the other hand, assuming one identifies with the freedom fighter, the brutal act is regarded in a more sympathetic, if not encouraging or at least ambivalent light.